

ISSUE MEMORANDUM

DATE	February 5, 2016		
то	Board of Psychology Members		
FROM Jason Glasspiegel Central Services Coordinator			
SUBJECT	Agenda Item #12 b) – Update regarding the California Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (CANRA) and Mandated Reporting – Penal Code Sections 261.5, 288, and 11165.1		

Background:

The Board of Psychology requested an opinion from the Attorney General (AG) whether oral copulation and sodomy between minors of like age is reportable. The Board's request is still pending (Pending Opinion Request #15-201 – Eisenberg), due to a complaint against the AG's office.

Enclosures: Copy of the complaint filed against the AG.

Action Requested:

This item is for informational purposes only. There is no action required of the Board.

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By Crustina Hugalin Deputy Facsimile: (310) 203-2727 mhardiman@nelsonhardiman.com Cristina Grijalva jradke@nelsonhardiman.com 6 szimmitti@nelsonhardiman.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs 8 9 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT 10 T OLYMPIC BOULEVARD, BUITE ANGELES, GALIFORNIA BESSÉ 11 BC 573135 CASE NO .: DON L. MATHEWS, M.F.T., MICHAEL NELSON HARDIMAN LLP 12 L. ALVAREZ, M.F.T., and WILLIAM OWEN, CADC II, 13 COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND Plaintiffs. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 14 15 KAMALA D. HARRIS, in her official 16 capacity as Attorney General of California; and JACKIE LACEY in her official 17 capacity as the District Attorney of the county of Los Angeles and representative 18 of the California's district attorneys, 19 Respondents. 20 \odot N 21 Plaintiffs Don L. Mathews, M.F.T., Michael L. Alvarez, M.F.T., and William Owen. N 22 CADC II, allege as follows: **(**) 23 INTRODUCTION W 24 Plaintiffs Don L. Mathews, M.F.T., Michael L. Alvarez, D. 0 25 تبسأ Owen, CADC II ("Plaintiffs") hereby bring this Complaint for Declaratory and Injuritive Relief U1 26 to enjoin and prohibit the Attorney General of California and the district attorneys of California (collectively, "Defendants") from enforcing Assembly Bill ("A.B.") 1775's recent amendment to 27 28 COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELITER

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the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act ("CANRA"), Penal Code section 11165.1, subd. (c) (2015), requiring psychotherapists (including marriage and family therapists ("MFTs")) to now report any patient who has ever downloaded or viewed child pornography on the Internet or on his cell phone to law enforcement authorities on the ground that this statute violates the patient's constitutional right to privacy regarding his confidential communications with a psychotherapist under article I, section 1, of the California Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and subjects psychotherapists to criminal prosecution and loss of their licenses if they fail to comply with this illegal reporting requirement.

- 2. While child pornography is despicable, morally repugnant and the product of child sexual abuse, A.B. 1775's mandated reporting of child pornography viewing by psychotherapy patients unjustifiably violates their constitutional right of privacy regarding communications to their therapists, the confidentiality of which is critical and essential to the efficacy of psychotherapy to treat mental health issues. This reporting requirement is unconstitutional because it does not substantially further CANRA's purpose of identifying and protecting children from "hands on" abuse occurring in real life and is therefore outweighed by the patients' right to privacy and the compelling public interest (embodied in Evidence Code section 1104's psychotherapist-patient privilege) in ensuring that patients seeking psychotherapy treatment for sexual disorders, including pedophilia, can do so without fear of criminal prosecution and public disgrace.
- 3. Until A.B. 1775 was passed, CAMRA furthered the state's legitimate interest in protecting children from abuse by requiring psychotherapists to report any known or suspected children being sexually abused or exploited by others in the real world so that these child victims could be identified and protected by law enforcement authorities. Now, however, A.B. 1775 has dramatically and unconstitutionally expanded the scope of CANRA by requiring psychotherapists to violate the confidences of patients who report viewing child pornography over the Internet or on their cell phones without any evidence that the patient has engaged in "hands-on" sexual abuse of a child or that the depicted child victim can realistically be identified

and protected by law enforcement authorities. The overbroad nature of A.B. 1775's invasion of the privacy rights of patients extends to the reporting of minors who view sexually explicit self-portraits sent to them by other minors over cell phone networks. This practice, known as "sexting," does not involve any child abuse that CANRA was intended to prevent and its mandated reporting will serve only to shame and embarrass the minor patients involved. In addition, the mandated reporting of child pornography viewing will unnecessarily deter persons with sexual disorders from seeking psychotherapy treatment and improperly expend tax payer dollars on enforcement of an unconstitutional law that does not substantially further CANRA's salutary purpose of identifying and protecting children in California who are being abused by others.

4. Since the state cannot show that CANRA's purpose of protecting children from child abuse is substantially furthered by A.B. 1775's invasion of the patients' constitutional right to privacy regarding their communications to psychotherapists, this statutory amendment is unconstitutional under the California and U.S. Constitutions and its enforcement must be enjoined. In particular, the patients' right to privacy and the public interest in ensuring that persons seeking psychotherapy to address sexual disorders can obtain such treatment without fear of criminal prosecution trumps the Legislature's misguided transformation of CANRA into a vehicle to criminally prosecute child pornography viewers, a purpose which CANRA does not serve and that is not within any exception to Evidence Code section 1104's psychotherapist-patient privilege.

PARTIES

5. Plaintiff Don L. Mathews, M.F.T., is a resident of Walnut Creek, California and licensed as a marriage and family therapist ("MFT") by the State of California. He is the founder and director of Impulse Treatment Center located in Walnut Creek, California, the largest outpatient treatment center for sexual compulsion/addiction in the United States. The center employs numerous licensed psychotherapists and is currently treating approximately 100 clients with sexual compulsivity disorders. Mr. Mathews' treatment program lasts for a period of three months to several years and currently includes 18 groups of sexually compulsive clients and their

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families. Mr. Mathews is also a California State Sex Offender Management Board (CASOMB)

Certified Practitioner qualified to treat sex offenders. He is a member of SASH (Society for Advancement of Sexual Health, formerly National Counsel on Sexual Addiction and Compulsivity), CAMFT (California Association of Marriage and Family Therapists) and past President of the East Bay Chapter of CAMFT. Mr. Mathews brings this complaint as an MFT caught between the mandated reporting of child pornography viewing imposed by A.B. 1775's amendment of CANRA and his ethical obligations to provide confidential psychotherapy services to patients who present no serious danger of "hands on" or "contact" sexual abuse or exploitation of children, and his patients' right of privacy under the California and U.S. Constitutions regarding their confidential communications to him during therapy. He also asserts his beneficial interest as a citizen concerned for the proper performance of a public duty in an area of general public interest. (See Planned Parenthood Affiliates of California v. Van De Kamp (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 245, 256-257, citing Ballard v. Anderson (1971) 4 Cal.3d 873, 877 and Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 144–145.)

6. Plaintiff Michael L. Alvarez, M.F.T, is a resident of Palos Verdes, California and licensed as a marriage and family therapist by the State of California. In 1981, he established a private practice with a specialization in addictions, including sex addiction. He was the first program director and founder of the Sexual Disorders Program established in 1991 at Del Amo-Hospital in Torrance, California. Mr. Alvarez also created a specialized track for the treatment of non-violent sex offenders at that facility. He has testified as an expert in sexual abuse crime for both prosecutors and defendants on numerous occasions. Mr. Alvarez has presented at the National Council on Sex Addiction (presently SASH) and well as for the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers. Additionally, he has published articles in Sexual Addiction and Compulsivity: The Journal of Treatment and Prevention. He currently sees numerous patients who suffer from sexual addiction and compulsivity. Mr. Alvarez brings this complaint to assert his own rights as an MFT caught between the mandated reporting of child pornography viewing imposed by A.B. 1775's amendment of CANRA and his ethical obligations to provide confidential psychotherapy services to patients who present no serious danger of "hands on" or

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"contact" sexual abuse or exploitation of children, his patients' right of privacy under the California and U.S. Constitutions regarding their confidential communications to him during therapy, and his beneficial interest as a citizen concerned for the proper performance of a public duty in an area of general public interest.

- 7. Plaintiff William Owen is a resident of Los Angeles, California and a certified alcohol and drug counselor (CADC II). He has worked with sex addicts for the past 15 years, both as a counselor and intake director at various treatment programs, including the Sexual Disorders Unit at Del Amo Hospital, as well as in private practice. He brings this complaint to assert his beneficial interest as a citizen concerned for the proper performance of a public duty in an area of general public interest and his separate interest as a California taxpayer seeking to enjoin the expenditure of public monies in the enforcement of an invalid and unconstitutional law. (See Planned Parenthood Affiliates of California, 181 Cal.App.3d at 257, citing Hollman v. Warren (1948) 32 Cal.2d 351.)
- 8. Defendant Kamala D. Harris is the Attorney General of California charged with the enforcement of CANRA. The Attorney General has a major role in enforcing and implementing the law's provisions. She directs and controls the Department of Justice, and is responsible for maintaining the statewide databank of child abuse reports and with disseminating information from that bank to various agencies and law enforcement authorities. As the chief law enforcement officer of the state, the Attorney General has general enforcement power with respect to CANRA's criminal sanction for the non-reporting of known or suspected child abuse by psychotherapists and other mandated reporters.
- 9. Defendant Jackie Lacey is the District Attorney of the County of Los Angeles responsible for local enforcement of CANRA's penal provision against mandated reporters who fail to report child abuse or neglect. She is empowered to prosecute a psychotherapist who fails to report the viewing or downloading of child pornography by a patient as child abuse. She is named as a defendant in her capacity as a district attorney and as a representative of all California district attorneys. (See Planned Parenthood Affiliates of California, 181 Cal.App.3d

at 257, citing Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236, revd. on other grounds, Richardson v. Ramírez (1974) 418 U.S. 24.)

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 10. This case raises questions under the California and U.S. Constitutions. Thus, this Court has jurisdiction over all of Plaintiffs' claims. Jurisdiction in this case is also founded on California's common law taxpayer standing doctrine and California Code of Civil Procedure § 526a, which grant California taxpayers the right to sue government officials to prevent unlawful expenditures of taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed resources. (See Green v. Obledo, 29 Cal. 3d 28 126, 145 (1981); Blatr v. Pitchess, 5 Cal.3d 258, 268 (1971); Connerly v. Schwarzenegger, 146 Cal. App. 4th 739, 748-749, 751, fn. 5 (2007); Connerly v. State Personnel Bd., 92 Cal. App. 4th 16, 29-31 (2001). This Court is authorized to grant declaratory relief pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 and to grant injunctive relief pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure sections 525, 526, and 526(a).
- Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure sections 393, subdivision (b), 394, subdivision (a), and 401 because this action is brought against public officers in a county where the Attorney General and District Attorney maintain offices, perform their functions, and expend tax payer dollars.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. CALIFORNIA'S PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE (EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 1014)

12. As set forth in Evidence Code section 1014, California's psychotherapist-patient privilege provides that, "[s]ubject to Section 912 [waiver] and except as otherwise provided in this article, the patient, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between patient and psychotherapist..."

The privilege may be claimed by the patient or the psychotherapist. (Evid. Code § 1014.) A "psychotherapist" is defined to include a licensed psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker, or MFT. (Evid. Code § 1010.)

13. Over the years, the California legislature has enacted various statutory exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, most of which are set forth in the Evidence Code. (See Evidence Code sections 1016 through 1026.) In this case, however, the exception at issue is set forth in CANRA, a set of Penal Code statutes compelling psychotherapists and other mandated reporters to disclose known or suspected child abuse and neglect to law enforcement authorities and subjecting them to criminal penalties if they fail to do so.

B. THE CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT REPORTING ACT ("CANRA"), PENAL CODE SECTIONS 11164 ET SEO.

- 14. Under CANRA, Penal Code sections 11164 et seq., mandated reporters (including psychotherapists) are required to report suspected child abuse and neglect to law enforcement authorities. The California Legislature has made clear that it intends a psychotherapist's statutory duty to report child abuse to be an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege set forth in Evidence Code section 1014. (See Pen. Code § 11171, subd. (b) ["Neither the physician-patient privilege nor the psychotherapist-patient privilege applies to information reported pursuant to this article in any court proceeding or administrative hearing."]; People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 505, 512.)
- 15. CANRA has 44 categories of mandated reporters including psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, and MFTs. (Pen. Code § 11165.7, subd. (a)(1)-(44).) A report must be immediately made to law enforcement authorities of known or suspected child abuse or neglect involving physical abuse (Pen. Code § 11165.6); sexual abuse (Pen. Code § 11165.1); willful harming or endangerment (Pen. Code § 11165.3); general or severe neglect (Pen. Code § 11165.2); and unlawful corporal punishment or injury. (Pen. Code § 11165.4.)
- 16. CANRA's duty to report is triggered "whenever the mandated reporter, in his or her professional capacity or within the scope of his or her employment, has knowledge of or observes a child whom the mandated reporter knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of child abuse or neglect." (See Pen. Code § 11166, subd. (a).) A reasonable suspicion means "that it is objectively reasonable for a person to entertain a suspicion, based upon facts that could

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cause a reasonable person in a like position, drawing, when appropriate, on his or her training and experience, to suspect child abuse or neglect." (See Pen. Code § 11166, subd. (b).)

- 17. The mandated reporter must report child abuse or neglect to a police department or sheriff's department, a county probation department (if designated by the county to receive mandated reports), or a county welfare department. (See Pen. Code § 11165.9.) The report must include, if known, the names and present locations of the minor and the suspected child abuser, and the information that led the reporter to suspect child abuse or neglect. (Penal Code §11167, subd. (a).)
- 18. The local law enforcement agency with jurisdiction over the reported child abuse or neglect must conduct an investigation and send a report of any substantiated child abuse or severe neglect to the Department of Justice so that the child abuser can be listed in the state's Child Abuse Central Index ("CACI"), a statewide data base. (See Pen. Code §§ 11165.9, 11166.3, 11170.) The child abuse reports in CACI are not public documents, but may be released to a number of individuals and government agencies. (Pen. Code § 11167.5, subd. (b).) By way of examples, relevant CACI child abuse may be released to various agencies conducting child abuse investigations, child placement assessments, or background investigations of applicants seeking to adopt a child or to obtain a position as a peace officer or involving the care or supervision of children. (Pen. Code § 11170, subd. (b), 11170.5). CACI reports may also be disclosed to out-of-state agencies conducting child abuse investigations or adoption and foster care assessments. (Pen. Code § 11170, subds. (d),(e).)
- 19. The Department of Justice apparently maintains CACI reports of child abuse as permanent records with three exceptions. First, once a person listed in a CACI report reaches 100 years of age, the report must be deleted. (Pen. Code § 11169, subd. (f).) Second, reports involving a person who was under 18 years of age at the time of the report must be deleted from the CACI 10 years from the date of the incident resulting in the CACI listing, if no subsequent report concerning the same person is received during that time period. (Pen. Code § 11170, subd. (a)(3).) Third, if a person is listed in the CACI only as a victim of child abuse or neglect, and that person is 18 years of age or older, that person may have his or her name removed from

the index by making a written notarized request to the Department of Justice. (Pen. Code § 11170, subd. (g).)

- 20. A mandated reporter's failure to report is a misdemeanor crime punishable by up to six months in prison, a fine of \$1,000, or both. (See Pen. Code § 11166, subd. (c).) In addition, an MFT who fails to comply with Penal Code section 11166's reporting requirements is guilty of unprofessional conduct that may result in the suspension or revocation of his/her license. (See Bus. & Prof. Code § 4982, subd. (w).)
- 21. With the exception of certain types of sexual abuse, CANRA generally only requires the mandated reporting of known or suspected physical abuse or neglect of children. For example, reports must be made of "physical injury or death inflicted by other than accidental means upon a child by another person," (Pen. Code § 11165.6); "the negligent failure of a person having the care or custody of a child to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or supervision where no physical injury to the child has occurred," (Pen. Code § 11165.6); "any person [who] willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon, unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of the child to be placed in a situation in which his or her person or health is endangered, (Pen. Code § 11165.3); or "any person [who] willfully inflicts upon any child any cruel or inhuman corporal punishment or injury resulting in a traumatic condition." (Pen. Code § 11165.4).

C. A.B. 1775'S AMENDMENT OF CANRA, PENAL CODE SECTION 11165.1, SUBD. (C)

22. In the case of child sexual abuse, Penal Code section 11165.1 provides that reportable sexual abuse includes "sexual assault" or "sexual exploitation" of a child. "Sexual assault" is defined as various sexual crimes against the person of a child, including rape, statutory rape, incest, sodomy, lewd and lascivious acts, oral copulation, sexual penetration, and molestation. (Pen. Code § 11165.1, subds. (a), (b); see Pen. Code §§ 261, 261.5, subd. (d), 264.1, 285, 286, 288, subds. (a), (b), or (c)(1), 288a, 289, 647.6.)

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- 23. Penal Code section 11165.1, subdivision (c) defines "sexual exploitation" to include the crimes of possession of child pornography with intent to sell, distribute or exhibit to others, employing a child to assist with such criminal activity, and knowingly employing a child to participate in prostitution, the live performance of obscene sexual acts, or child pornography. (Pen. Code §§ 311.2, 311.4, subd. (a),11165.1, subd. (c)(1), (2).)
- 24. In addition, the version of Penal Code section 11165.1, subdivision (c)(3) in effect until December 31, 2014 provided that "sexual exploitation" included:
 - (3) A person who depicts a child in, or who knowingly develops, duplicates, prints, or exchanges, a film, photograph, videotape, video recording, negative, or slide in which a child is engaged in an act of obscene sexual conduct.
- 25. Effective January 1, 2015, A.B. 1775 amended Penal Code section 11165.1, subdivision (c)(3), to now require mandated reporters to report any person who has simply downloaded or looked at child pornography from the Internet. The amended provision provides, in relevant part, as follows:
 - (3) A person who depicts a child in, or who knowingly develops, duplicates, prints, downloads, streams, accesses through any electronic or digital media, or exchanges, a film, photograph, videotape, video recording, negative, or slide in which a child is engaged in an act of obscene sexual conduct.

(Pen. Code § 11165.1, subd. (c) [emphasis added].)

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. A.B. 1775 VIOLATES A PATIENT'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY UNDER THE CALIFORNIA AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONS REGARDING HIS COMMUNICATIONS WITH PSYCHOTHERAPISTS

26. As psychotherapists, Plaintiffs Mathews and Alvarez have treated numerous patients who are seeking treatment for sex addiction, sexual compulsivity, and other sexual disorders, many of whom have admitted downloading and viewing child pornography on the Internet, but whom the petitioners, based on their considerable training and experience, do not believe present a serious danger of engaging in "hands-on" sexual abuse or exploitation of children or the distribution of child pornography to others. These patients typically have no prior

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criminal history, have never expressed a sexual preference for children, and are active and voluntary participants in psychotherapy to treat their particular sexual disorder, which often involves compulsive viewing of pornography of all kinds on the Internet.

- 27. In addition, Plaintiffs Mathews and Alvarez have also treated patients seeking treatment because of sexual disorders involving a sexual attraction to children (including pedophilia), who have admitted to downloading and viewing child pornography, but whom the petitioners, based on their training and experience, do not believe present a serious danger of engaging in "hands-on" sexual abuse or exploitation of children or the active distribution of child pornography to others. These patients typically have no prior criminal record or history of "hands on" sexual abuse of children, no access to children in their home or employment, no history of "hands-on" sexual abuse or exploitation of children, and often express disgust and shame about their sexual attraction to children for which they are actively and voluntarily seeking psychotherapy treatment.
- 28. Under California law, since Plaintiffs Mathews and Alvarez are psychotherapists, statements made by their patients to them during therapy "are generally treated as confidential and enjoy the protection of a psychotherapist-patient privilege." (*People v. Gonzales* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 353, 371.) California's psychotherapist-patient privilege (Evidence Code section 1014) is "an aspect of the patient's constitutional right to privacy" guaranteed by article I, section 1, of the California Constitution. (*Stritzinger*, 34 Cal.3d at 511, citing *In re Lifschutz* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 415, 431-432.) As a result, all attempted legal invasions of the confidentiality psychotherapist and patient communications (including by the California legislature) must be scrutinized in light of the patient's constitutionally protected right to privacy under the California Constitution. (*In re Lifschutz*, 2 Cal.3d at 431-432.)
- 29. Similarly, "the [U.S.] Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental privacy right in non-disclosure of personal medical information" under the U.S. Constitution. (Coons v. Lew (9th Cir. 2014) 762 F.3d 891, 900, citing Whalen v. Roe (1977) 429 U.S. 589, 599; Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d at 550.) This right to privacy is one of the personal liberties

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- 30. The patient's privacy interest in maintaining the confidentiality of psychotherapist and patient communications has long since been recognized by California and federal courts. The California Legislature enacted the psychotherapist-patient privilege in 1965 in recognition of the fact that the success of psychotherapy depends on the confidentiality of communications regarding "the most intimate and embarrassing details of the patient's life." (Gonzales, 56 Cal.4th at 371, quoting Cal. Law Revision Com., reprinted in Deering's Ann. Evid. Code § 1014, p. 217 (2004).) As explained by the California Supreme Court, the "contemporary value of the psychiatric profession, and its potential for the relief of emotional disturbances and of the inevitable tensions produced in our modern, complex society is bottomed on a confidential relationship, but the doctor can be of assistance only if the patient may freely relate his thoughts and actions, his fears and fantasies, his strengths and weaknesses, in a completely uninhibited manner." (Stritzinger, 34 Cal.3d at 514 [internal citations omitted].) In recognition of "the growing importance of the psychiatric profession in our modern, ultracomplex society," (In re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal.3d 415, 421), California courts have broadly construed the psychotherapist-patient privilege in favor of the patient. (See Stritzinger, 34 Cal.3d at 511; Roberts v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 330, 337.)
- 31. In the context of adopting a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege, the U.S. Supreme Court has also described the critical importance of maintaining the confidentiality of the psychotherapist-patient relationship:

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Effective psychotherapy . . . depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of the problems for which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential communications made during counseling sessions may cause embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the mere possibility of disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment. As the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee observed . . ., a psychiatrist's ability to help her patients "is completely dependent upon [the patients'] willingness and ability to talk freely. This makes it difficult if not impossible for [a psychiatrist] to function without being able to assure . . . patients of confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communication. Where there may be exceptions to this general rule . . ., there is wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful psychiatric treatment."

(Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10, quoting Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Rules, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1972).) Apart from protecting the patient's important privacy interests, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that maintaining the confidentiality of patient-psychotherapist communication also "serves the public interest by facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a mental or emotional problem" and recognizes that the "mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a public good of transcendent importance." (Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11.)

32. In this case, A.B. 1775's amendment of Penal Code section 11165.1, subdivision (c)(3), violates patients' right to privacy under the California and U.S. Constitutions because it compels Plaintiffs Mathews and Alvarez, and other California psychotherapists, to report current or future patients who admit downloading or viewing child pornography over the Internet to law enforcement authorities, despite the psychotherapists' professional opinions that these patients present no serious danger of otherwise reportable "hands-on" sexual abuse or exploitation of children, or risk a criminal misdemeanor conviction and the revocation of their licenses. The state's invasion of the patients' privacy rights includes both adult patients who view child pornography on the Internet, and minor patients who view sexually explicit "sexting selfies" sent by another minor over a cell phone even though such voluntary conduct between two minors would ordinarily be entirely legal if two adults were involved and such conduct does not fall within any reasonable definition of child sexual abuse.

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- 33. Under A.B. 1775, the mandated reporting of child pornography viewing by psychotherapists will obviously destroy the patient trust that communications during therapy will be kept confidential which is widely agreed to be the "sine qua non for successful psychiatric treatment." (Jaffee v. Redmond (1996) 518 U.S. 1, 10, quoting Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Rules, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1972) [internal quotation marks and citation omitted.]) In particular, once current patients who have admitted downloading or viewing child pornography during therapy learn that CANRA now requires Plaintiffs Mathews and Alvarez or other psychotherapists to report such activity to law enforcement authorities for investigation, they will either cease therapy because Plaintiffs have exposed them to criminal prosecution and public disgrace or, if they continue, are unlikely to continue providing the full disclosure of intimate details that Plaintiffs need to provide effective therapy. Similarly, persons who are seeking psychotherapy for serious sexual disorders may refuse such therapy once Plaintiffs inform them during intake screening that they are required to report any viewing of child pornography or, if the persons have already described such child pornography viewing as a reason for seeking treatment, that Plaintiffs are now obligated to report them before any therapy even begins. (See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10; Gonzales, 56 Cal.4th at 371.) Enforcement of A.B. 1775 will also deter existing or potential patients who have serious sexual disorders - including sexual attraction to children - from obtaining needed psychotherapy, despite the lack of any evidence that they have engaged in "hands-on" or "contact" sexual abuse of children.
- 34. However, as is true of many constitutional rights, under state and federal law, a psychotherapy patient's right to privacy is not absolute. Instead, a state may violate a patient's right to privacy if it can show a compelling state interest to justify its invasion of the patient's privacy. (See Stritzinger, 34 Cal.3d at 511; Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden (9th Cir. 2004) 379 F.3d 531, 551.) Under California law, "[e]ven where there is '(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances; and (3) conduct constituting a serious invasion of the privacy interest,' the constitutional right to privacy is not violated if 'the invasion of the privacy interest is justified because it substantially furthers one or

more legitimate competing or countervailing privacy or non-privacy interests." (People v. Ebertowski (2014) 228 Cal. App.4th 1170, 1176, quoting In re Christopher M. (2005) 127 Cal. App.4th 684, 695.)

- 35. Likewise, under federal law, in order "to determine whether the governmental interest in obtaining information outweighs the individual's privacy interest," a court must weigh the following factors: "(1) the type of information requested, (2) the potential for harm in any subsequent non-consensual disclosure, (3) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, (4) the degree of the need for access, and (5) whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating toward access." (Tucson Woman's Clinic, 379 F.3d at 551, citing Planned Parenthood of Southern Arizona v. Lawall (9th Cir. 2002) 307 F.3d 783, 790.) "It is the state's burden to demonstrate that 'its use of the information would advance a legitimate state interest and that its actions are narrowly tailored to meet the legitimate interest." (Lawall, 307 F.3d at 790, quoting In re Crawford (9th Cir. 1999) 194 F.3d 954, 959.)
- 36. California courts have upheld the constitutionality of various exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, but only if the exception is narrowly drawn and based on a compelling state interest that is substantially furthered by the exception in question. (See e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 439, [psychotherapist's duty to warn about a patient posing a serious danger of violence to others did not violate patient's right to privacy in light of state's interest in protecting citizens from violent assault], superseded by statute, Civil Code section 43.92 (1985); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal.3d at 432 [patient-litigant exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege (Evid. Code § 1016) did not invade patient's right to privacy given state's interest in facilitating ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings where patient puts his mental and emotional state at issue].)
- 37. In this case, the California Legislature's compelling interest in preventing child abuse through CAMRA is not substantially furthered by requiring psychotherapists to report patients (including minors) who have only viewed child pornography, even if just for a moment,

when there is no reasonable likelihood that the depicted child victims are in California and can be identified and protected by state law enforcement authorities, and no evidence that such patients have engaged in actual "hands on" sexual abuse of children in real life. As a result, the state cannot justify A.B. 1775's violation of the patients' constitutional right to privacy when this overbroad reporting requirement does not further a mandatory CAMRA reporting scheme "aimed at increasing the likelihood that child abuse victims are identified." (*James W. v. Superior Court* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 246, 254.)

- A.B. 1775 Is Unconstitutional Because There is No Reasonable
 Likelihood That the Child Victims Depicted In Child Pornography Are In
 California and Can Be Identified and Protected By the State
- 38. A.B. 1775's amendment of CAMRA to include the viewing of child pornography through "any electronic or digital media" coincides with the explosion of available pornography, including child pornography, on the Internet.
- culture that required significant motivation and effort to locate and obtain by mail—usually only by dedicated pedophiles and child sexual abusers—have long since ended. (See United States Sentencing Commission, Report To The Congress: Sex Offenses Against Children: Findings And Recommendations Regarding Federal Penalties, 29 (June 1996) [only 35 of 112 federal child pornography cases sentenced in 1994 and 1995 involved use of computer]; United States Sentencing Commission ("USSC"), Federal Child Pornography Offenses, Executive Summary, 126 (2012) ("2012 USSC Report") [in 1992, there were 77 federal criminal non-production child pornography cases, compared to 1,717 such cases in 2010].) By "the mid-1980's, the trafficking of child pornography within the United States was almost completely eradicated through a series of successful campaigns waged by law enforcement. Producing and reproducing child sexual abuse images was difficult and expensive. Anonymous distribution and receipt was not possible, and it was difficult for pedophiles to find and interact with each other. For these reasons, child pornographers became lonely and hunted individuals because the purchasing and trading of such

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images was extremely risky. Unfortunately, the child pornography market exploded [with] the advent of the Internet and advanced digital technology." (Child Exploitation and Obscenity Unit, U.S. Dep't of Justice, *Child Pornography*, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/subjectareas/childporn.html.)

- 40. Today, "[n]on-production child pornography offenses have become almost exclusively Internet-enabled crimes." (See 2012 USSC Report at ii, 6.) Child pornography is now unfortunately freely and easily accessible for viewing and downloading from the Internet to anyone who has a computer and Internet access. (See 2012 USSC Report, Executive Summary, 5 (2012); Endrass J., Urbaniok F., The consumption of Internet child pornography and violent and sex offending, BMC Psychiatry 9:43 (2009).) The widespread acquisition of child pornography is facilitated by the Internet's accessibility, affordability and anonymity. (See Endrass & Urbaniok, supra; Hamilton M., The Child Pornography Crusade and Its Net Widening Effect, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 1679, 1681 (2012) (citing Cooper A, Sexuality and the Internet: Surfing Into the New Millennium, 1 Cyberpsychology & Behavior 187 (1998).) "Illegal images no longer have to be developed, printed, and shipped; instead, they are digitally recorded and made available for unlimited distribution at virtually no cost." (2012 USSC Report at 43.) At the click of a mouse button, child pornography images are now "readily available through virtually every Internet technology including websites, email, instant messaging/ICQ, Internet Relay Chat (IRC), newsgroups, bulletin boards, peer-to-peer networks, and social networking sites." (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Child Pornography, supra.)
- 41. It has been estimated that the number of child pornography images on the Internet "runs into the millions and the number of individual children depicted is most likely in the tens of thousands." (See U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, Najat M'jid Maalla, A/HRC/25/48, 5 (2013); 2012 USSC Report at 107[noting estimate of "over five million unique child pornography images on the Internet"] U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, Najat M'jid

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Maalla, A/HRC/12/23, 9 (2009) ("2009 UN Report") ["Since child pornography is illegal, it is difficult to estimate the number of minors worldwide who are victims of these networks; estimates range from 10,000 to 100,000."]) Child pornography is produced in countries all over the world and then distributed across international borders via the Internet, including in and to the United States, a major market. (See Bunzeluk K, Child Sexual Abuse Images – Analysis of Websites by Cybertip, Canadian Centre for Child Protection, 11, 44 (2009) [study found Internet sites containing child pornography were hosted in close to 60 countries, with the United States, Canada, Russia, the Netherlands, Spain and Thailand being the top six host countries with the most illegal images.])

- 42. Given the international nature and scale of child pornography production and the availability of Internet distribution, "[i]dentifying and establishing the whereabouts of a child who has participated in pornographic scenes are difficult tasks for the authorities," (2009 UN Report at 15.) Between 2003 and 2009, the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children Child Victim Identification Program, a public-private partnership which assists law enforcement in identifying the victims of child pornography, reviewed and analyzed 15 million child pernography images, but only identified 1,600 child victims. (2009 UN report at 15-16.) Similarly, as of 2009, INTERPOL's Child Abuse Image Database contained more than 550,000 images submitted by member countries, but assisted authorities in rescuing only 870 child victims worldwide. (2009 UN report at 6.) Identifying and protecting the depicted child victim based solely on a child pornography image is therefore extremely difficult. (See Friedman E. Clues Caught on Tape Key to Child Porn Cases, Abenews.com. New York: American Broadcasting Company (Sept. 28, 2007) ["Less than 1 percent of children who appear in sex tapes are found each year, according to Interpol statistics", available at http://abcnews.go.com /print? id= 3665900.)
- 43. A.B. 1775's mandated reporting by a psychotherapist of patients who have viewed child pornography on the Internet includes patients who may often be accessing illegal images on the Internet that were produced or stored in another state or on another continent. The state's practical ability to identify the depicted child victims from the images alone is extremely

limited. A.B. 1775 therefore creates no realistic likelihood that state law enforcement authorities will be able to rescue the depicted children from further sexual abuse by the pornography producers, let alone identify and protect child abuse victims residing in California, the class of children that CAMRA was designed to protect.

- As originally enacted, the predecessor statute to CAMRA established a comprehensive reporting scheme "directed toward discovering suspected child abuse and, to that end, encouraging reporters to spread the word as quickly as possible . . . so that independent governmental agencies can remove the child from immediate danger and investigate." (*James W.*, 17 Cal.App.4th at 254; *Stecks*, 38 Cal.App.4th at 371.) This statutory purpose has not changed. CAMRA currently provides that the "intent and purpose of this article is to protect children from abuse and neglect" and directs that "all persons participating in the investigation of [suspected child abuse] shall consider the needs of the child victim and shall do whatever is necessary to prevent psychological harm to the child." (Pen. Code § 11164, subd. (b); *James W.*, 17 Cal.App.4th at 255 [purpose of mandated reporting is "to increase the likelihood that child abuse is identified and reported to authorities for investigation."])
- children who reside within its borders." (Allison v. Superior Court (1979) 99 Cal. App.3d 993, 998; In re Christopher I. (2003) 106 Cal. App.4th 533, 557.) However, CAMRA's reporting requirement does not extend to protecting child abuse victims in other states or countries when California has no territorial jurisdiction over such children. (See Global Packaging, Inc. v. Superior Court (2011) 196 Cal. App.4th 1623, 1630 [state's "power ultimately ends at the state line."]) In other words, the state cannot justify its violation of its citizens' right to privacy based on the extremely slim possibility that state law enforcement authorities will be able to help identify and protect the children depicted in the child pornography from further sexual abuse somewhere in the world without any reasonable probability that such children are actually in California or are even still minors at the time that the child pornography is viewed and seized.

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- 46. In addition, the purpose of CAMRA's reporting requirement is not to criminally prosecute child abusers although such prosecutions may follow based on the authorities' investigation of reports but to identify and protect the Californian children who are the victims of either abuse or neglect, conduct that is not always criminal in nature under the statute. (See e.g., Penal Code § 11165.2, subd. (b) [mandating report of 'the negligent failure of a person having the care or custody of a child to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or supervision where no physical injury to the child has occurred."]) Rather, "[i]dentification of abuse not identification of the perpetrator is the chief concern" of CAMRA's reporting scheme. (James W., 17 Cal.App.4th at 255.) Any criminal prosecution of a child abuser is the responsibility of the law enforcement "authorities investigating the abuse and the criminal justice system." (Id.)
- 47. In this case, the state cannot justify A.B. 1775's new reporting requirement for child pornography viewing by psychotherapy patients based on the state's interest in protecting the depicted children from further abuse by the pornography producers. Instead, the nature and scope of child pornography creates no reasonable likelihood that the children victimized in the illegal images reside in California and can be identified and protected by state law enforcement authorities. While the reporting of psychotherapy patients who view child pornography would doubtlessly assist law enforcement authorities to criminally prosecute them for possession of child pornography, this state interest falls outside CAMRA's statutory purpose and instead is the separate responsibility of the state's criminal justice system. As such, A.B. 1775 does not substantially further CAMRA's purpose to "identify victims, bring them to the attention of the authorities, and, where warranted, permit intervention," to the extent that the children to be protected are those depicted in the illegal images. (Stecks v. Young (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 365, 371.)
 - . 2. A.B. 1775 Is Unconstitutional Because There is No Evidence That

 Patients Who Have Viewed Child Pornography Have Engaged In "Hands
 On" Sexual Abuse of Children

- 48. Plaintiffs' clinical experience that many of their patients have admitted downloading or viewing child pornography during therapy for sexual disorders, but do not present a serious danger of "hands-on" sexual abuse of children, correlates with the wide and easy availability of such illegal images on the Internet.
- 49. With millions of child pornography images now freely available online, the psychological profiles of psychotherapy patients who have downloaded or viewed child pornography on the Internet are no longer limited to pedophilia, but include a range of sexual disorders such as sex addiction and sexual compulsivity and other psychological disorders that often manifest in compulsive viewing of all kinds of Internet pornography, including child pornography.
- 50. While pedophiles have the most direct sexual motivation to access child pornography, empirical research has shown individuals may view child pornography for a variety of motivations, such as indiscriminate deviant sexual interests that include sexual interest in children, problematic Internet use leading to "habituation to adult pornography and an increasing need to identify new and more extreme images in order to achieve sexual arousal," including child pornography "images that previously may have been horrifying to the offender," as well as "initial curiosity, compulsive collecting behaviors, avoidance of stress or dissatisfaction with life, and an ability to create a new and more socially successful identity (within an online community)." (2012 USCC Report at 78-79 [internal citations omitted]; see U.S. v. C.R. (E.D.N.Y. 2011) 792 F.Supp.2d 343, 373, reversed on other grounds, U.S. v. Reingold (2nd Cir. 2013) 731 F.3d 204.).)
- 51. More importantly, few, if any, members of the psychotherapy community now believe that psychotherapy patients who admit to online viewing of child pornography have actually engaged in "hands-on" or "contact" sexual abuse or exploitation of children or present a serious danger of doing so in the absence of other risk factors, such a prior criminal record or history of "contact" sex crimes against children. (See United States v. Apodaca, 641 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011); C.R., 792 F. Supp. at 376 ["Scientifically acceptable empirical analyses

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have thus far failed to establish a causal link between the mere passive viewing of child pornography . . . and the likelihood of future contact offenses."])

52, In particular, the common belief that a person's viewing of online child pornography by itself means that person has committed or presents a high risk of committing "hands-on" or "contact" sexual abuse of child has been convincingly refuted by recent and scientifically reliable empirical evidence. (See Berlin FS, Pedophilia and DSM-5: The Importance of Clearly Defining the Nature of a Pedophilic Disorder, J Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 42:404-7, 405 ['From a purely statistical standpoint (all else being equal) individuals with no history of a hands-on sexual offense against a child, but who have accessed child pornography, are at low risk as a group of committing a hands-on sexual offense in the future"]; Lee AF, et al., Predicting Hands-On Child Sexual Offenses Among Possessors of Internet Child Pornography, 18 Psych., Public Pol'y & L. 644, 646 (2012) ["When predisposition is present, pomography may increase risk. Absent predisposition, exposure to pornography alone is not likely to instigate an offense"]; Seto MC, Hanson RK, Babchishin, KM, Contact Sexual Offending by Men With Online Sexual Offenses, Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment 23(1) 124-145 (2011) [study found that online child pomography offenders "who had no history of contact offenses almost never committed contact sexual offenses, despite a comparably high likelihood that they were sexually interested in children"]; McCarthy J, Internet Sexual Activity: A Comparison Between Contact and Non-Contact Child Pornography Offenders, 16 J. Sexual Aggression 181, 194 (2010) ["[P]ossessing child pornography, by itself, is not a causative factor in the perpetration of child sexual abuse and thus other factors need to be considered when evaluating the dangerousness of these offenders ..."; Howitt D., Pornography and the Paedophile: Is it Criminogenic?, 68 British J. of Med. Psychol. 15 (1995) [after interviews with small sample of contact child sex offenders, concluding that pornography has no simple direct causal effect on offendingl; Webb L, Craissati J, Keen S, Characteristics of Internet Child Pornography Offenders: A Comparison With Child Molesters, 19 Sex Abuse 449, 451 (2007) [after reviewing research on causal links between viewing child pomography and "contact" sexual abuse of children, concluding that "as yet, there is no

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empirical support for a direct causal link between Internet sex offending and the commission of contact offenses"]; Endrass & Urbaniok, *supra*, at 43 [based on criminal records of 231 men convicted of viewing child pornography, study concluded that "consumption of child pornographic material alone does not seem to predict hands-on sex offenses" and men without a prior sexual conviction were unlikely to sexually assault a child, with only 1% known to have committed a "hands-on" sexual abuse crime before conviction and only 1% committing such a hands-on sex crime in the 6 years after].)

- federal agency responsible for establishing sentencing policies and practices for federal courts and assisting Congress in the development of effective and efficient crime policy, including with respect to federal child pornography crimes, also concluded that although "child pornography validates and normalizes the sexual abuse of children, social science research has <u>not</u> established that viewing child pornography 'causes' the typical offender to progress to other sex offending against minors." (2012 USSC Report, Executive Summary at vii [emphasis added].) Instead, the Commission found that "most current social science research suggests that viewing child pornography, in the absence of other risk factors, does not 'cause' individuals to commit sex offenses." (USSC Report at 102 [citations omitted, emphasis added].) The Commission also conducted a study of the recidivism rate of men convicted of non-production child pornography crimes in 1999 and 2000 which showed that only 3.6% of the offenders were subsequently convicted of "contact" sex crimes against children. (2012 USCC Report at 310.)
- 54. In this case, A.B. 1775 does not substantially further CAMRA's purpose of identifying and protecting children from abuse because a patient's viewing of child pornography does not constitute evidence that the patient has engaged in "hands on" sexual abuse or sexual exploitation of children. While Plaintiffs are sensitive to the argument that every viewing of a child pornography image further debases and harms the reputation and emotional well-being of the depicted child, this type of indirect emotional harm to a child (and perhaps now an adult) unknown to the viewer does not fall within CANRA's definition of child abuse.

- 55. Instead, CANRA generally limits mandated reporting to "hands on" or "contact" sexual abuse (e.g., rape, incest, sodomy, lewd and lascivious acts) and sexual exploitation (e.g., prostitution, pornography production) of children, and expressly provides that mandated reporters are not required to report known or suspected "serious emotional damage" of a child, but may do so. (See Pen. Code § 11166.05.) Accordingly, the state cannot justify its invasion of patients' privacy rights on the ground that child pornography viewing constitutes emotional "abuse" of the depicted child because CANRA only mandates reporting of "hands on" sexual abuse exploitation of identifiable children in the real world, not indirect emotional harm to children in a virtual world involving viewers' fantasies and sexual interests, however disgusting or aberrant.
- 56. Since there is no empirical evidence that a psychotherapy patient viewing child pornography has actually engaged in "hands on" sexual abuse or exploitation of children, the state's interest in protecting children from real-life abuse is not substantially furthered by A.B. 1775's mandated reporting of conduct that does not help law enforcement authorities to protect Californian children from such abuse. Instead, A.B. 1775 will simply "overburden the reporting system and divert resources from the investigation of reports of actual abuse thereby working a detriment to the very abused children the Legislature has acted to protect." (*Planned Parenthood Affiliates of California*, 181 Cal.App.3d at 269.)
 - 3. A.B. 1775 Is Unconstitutional Because CANRA's Mandated Reporting Is

 Intended to Protect Children Who Are Victims of Abuse, Not to Identify

 Persons Who May Pose a Danger to Children
- 57. A.B. 1775 is also an unconstitutional invasion of the privacy rights of psychotherapy patients to the extent that the state is seeking to transform CANRA's mandated reporting scheme to identify and protect child abuse victims into a prophylactic vehicle to identify patients who may pose a potential danger of engaging in "hands on" sexual abuse of children because they have viewed child pornography.

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- 58. CANRA does not require mandated reporters to report persons who present a possible danger of sexually abusing or exploiting children. Instead, CANRA's duty to report is only triggered "whenever the mandated reporter, in his or her professional capacity or within the scope of his or her employment, has knowledge of or observes a child whom the mandated reporter knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of child abuse or neglect." (See Pen. Code § 11166, subd. (a).) This statutory directive unambiguously requires psychotherapist to only violate their patients' confidences when they know or suspect that the patient has engaged in "hands on" abuse of a child. Thus, even if child pornography viewers all presented a serious danger of "hands on" sexual abuse or exploitation of children, CANRA's reporting scheme does not currently mandate the reporting of situations involving only a predictive danger of child sexual abuse, but is limited to the reporting of known or suspected child sexual abuse that has actually occurred so that the child victims can be identified and rescued.
- 59. In addition, even CANRA were to require psychotherapists to report patients who presented a possible danger of abusing children, current empirical research (see Paragraphs 51-53) shows that patients who view child pornography on the Internet do not present a serious danger of "hands on" sexual abuse of children absent other risk factors and almost never engage in such conduct. (See also Apodaca, 641 F.3d at 106 (Fletcher J., concurring) ["Current empirical literature casts serious doubt on the existence of a substantial relationship between the consumption of child pornography and the likelihood of a contact sexual offense against a child."] Thus, the state cannot legitimately justify A.B. 1775 on the basis that a patient who views child pornography poses a serious danger of sexually assaulting a child. Furthermore, the state's reliance on notoriously unreliable predictions of future dangerousness is insufficient to justify its violation of the patient's right to privacy or to outweigh the state's interest in ensuring that its citizens can obtain confidential psychotherapy without fear that their communications will be publically disclosed. (See Stritzinger, 34 Cal.3d at 511, [psychotherapist-patient privilege "encourages those who may pose a threat to themselves or to others, because of some mental or emotional disturbance, to seek professional assistance"]; Tarasoff, 17 Cal.3d at 451-452 (conc. &

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dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) ["psychiatric predictions of violence are inherently unreliable" and ""[p]redictions of dangerous behavior, no matter who makes them, are incredibly inaccurate.""])

60. As a result, the state cannot justify A.B. 1775's invasion of the patients' privacy rights on the ground that their viewing of child pornography demonstrates that they present a danger to children because CANRA does not mandate the reporting of conduct involving only a possible danger of child abuse, and, in any event, there is no reliable empirical evidence that child pornography viewers (especially psychotherapy patients) present a serious danger of engaging in "hands on" sexual abuse of children in the absence of other risk factors.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CONSTTUTIONALITY OF A.B. 1775 UNDER CALIFORNIA CONSTIUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION I

- 61. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 60 above as though fully set forth in this paragraph.
- A.B. 1775's amendment of CANRA, Penal Code §11165.1(c), to require that mandated reporters, including psychotherapists, report any persons who view child pornography, as applied to psychotherapy patients, is an unconstitutional and overbroad violation of the patients' right to privacy under article I, section 1 of the California Constitution. Specifically, the state's compelling interest in protecting children from abuse is not substantially furthered by requiring psychotherapists to report patients who view child pornography when there is no realistic likelihood that the depicted children are in California and can be identified and protected by law enforcement authorities and no reliable empirical evidence that such patients have actually engaged in "hands-on" sexual abuse or exploitation of identifiable children in the real world. As a result, A.B. 1775's invasion of the patients' constitutional privacy rights (embodied in Evidence Code section 1104's psychotherapist-patient privilege) is unjustified and outweighed by the state's interest in ensuring that its citizens can obtain needed psychotherapy, the confidentiality of which is critical and essential to its successful treatment of mental health issues, including sexual disorders.

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- Attorney General of California and the District Attorneys of California over whether A.B. 1775's 2015 amendment to CANRA, Penal Code §11165.1(c) violates psychotherapy patients' constitutional right to privacy under article I, section 1 of the California constitution. Plaintiffs contend that A.B. 1775 is unconstitutional and its enforcement must be enjoined. Defendants contend otherwise.
- 64. A judicial determination resolving this actual controversy is necessary and appropriate at this time.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CONSTTUTIONALITY OF A.B. 1775 UNDER FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF U.S. CONSTIUTION,

- 65. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 64 above as though fully set forth in this paragraph.
- psychotherapists, report any persons who view child pornography, as applied to psychotherapy patients, is an unconstitutional and overbroad violation of the patients' right to privacy guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the state's compelling interest in protecting children from abuse is not substantially furthered by requiring psychotherapists to report patients who view child pornography when there is no realistic likelihood that the depicted children are in California and can be identified and protected by law enforcement authorities and no reliable empirical evidence that such patients have actually engaged in "hands-on" sexual abuse or exploitation of identifiable children in the real world. As a result, A.B. 1775's invasion of the patients' right to privacy under the U.S. Constitution is unjustified and outweighed by the state's interest in ensuring that its citizens can obtain needed psychotherapy, the confidentiality of which is critical and essential to its successful treatment of mental health issues, including sexual disorders.
- 67. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiffs and the Attorney General of California and the District Attorneys of California over whether A.B. 1775's

2015 amendment to CANRA, Penal Code §11165.1(c) violates psychotherapy patients' right to privacy guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs contend that A.B. 1775 is unconstitutional and its enforcement must be enjoined. Defendants contend otherwise.

68. A judicial determination resolving this actual controversy is necessary and appropriate at this time.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION - INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

- 69. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 68 above as though fully set forth in this paragraph.
- 70. Plaintiffs are psychotherapists who treat patients who have viewed child pornography, but whom Petitioners believe do not present a serious danger of "hands on" sexual abuse or exploitation of children. Unless enforcement of A.B. 1775 is enjoined by order of this Court, Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm because they will be forced to either violate the trust and confidentiality of communications by patients who have viewed child pornography by reporting such conduct to law enforcement authorities, or potentially face a criminal misdemeanor conviction and loss of their license if they fail to report such patients.
- 71. Unless enforcement of A.B. 1775 is enjoined by order of this Court, patients of Plaintiffs who report viewing child pornography will suffer irreparable harm because Plaintiffs are required to report such conduct to law enforcement authorities, thereby exposing the patients to criminal prosecution for possession of child pornography and public shame and disgrace.
- 72. Defendants will continue enforcing A.B. 1775 even though it is unconstitutional under the California and U.S. Constitutions unless enjoined by order of this Court thereby causing Plaintiffs and their patients who have viewed child pornography to suffer irreparable injury because their psychotherapist-patient relationship will be damaged or destroyed, Plaintiffs will face criminal prosecution and loss of licensure if they fail to comply with A.B. 1775, and the patients will face criminal prosecution and public disgrace if Plaintiffs report their conduct.
 - 73. Plaintiffs have no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law.

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray for judgment as follows:

- For a prohibitory permanent injunction enjoining Defendants' enforcement of A.B. 1775's amendment of Penal Code section 11165.1, subdivision (c) against psychotherapists;
- 2. For a judicial declaration that A.B. 1775's amendment of Penal Code section 11165.1, subdivision (c) is unconstitutional as applied to psychotherapy patients because this statute violates their privacy rights under article I, section 1 of the California Constitution and/or the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution;
- 3. For reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5;
 - 4. For costs of suit; and
 - 5. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Dated: February 20, 2015

Respectfully submitted,

NELSON HARDIMAN LLP

MARK HARDIMAN

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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	ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State for combot and nedgest) —Mark Hardiman, Esq. (SBN 136602) Jonatham Radke, Esq. (SBN 257324) Salvatore Zimmitti, Esq. (245678 NELSON HARDIMAN LLP	FOR COURT USE BADY
	* 11835 W. Olympic Blvd., Suite 900 Los Angeles, CA 90064 TELEPHONE NO.: 310-203-2800 FAX NO.: 310 203-2727	Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles
	ATTORNEY FOR (Name): Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Don Mathews, M.F.T et al. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES STREET ADDRESS: 111 N. HILL STREET	FEB 2 0 2015
	MAILING ADDRESS: SAME AS ABOVE CITY AND ZIP GODE: LOS ANGELES, CA 90012	Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk By Chattan Malia Deputy Oristina Grijalda
S. In	CASE NAME: CENTRAL DISTRICT CASE NAME: CENTR	BC 5 7 8 1 8 5
	CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET Complex Case Designation XX Unlimited Counter Joinder	CASE NUMBER:
*	demanded demanded ls Filed with first appearance by defendant exceeds \$25,000 \$25,000 or less) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3,402)	Judge: Oept:
	Items 1-6 below must be completed (see instructions on pa	ge 2).
	1. Check one box below for the case type that bast describes this case: Auto Tort Contract Provide Cal. 1 Auto (22) Breach of contract/warranty (06)	sionally Complex Civil Litigation Rules of Court, rules 3.400-3.403)
	Uninsured motorist (46) Rule 3,740 collections (09) Other PI/PD/WD (Personal Injury/Property Other collections (09)	Antitrust/Trade regulation (03) . Construction defect (10)
	Damage/Wrongful Death) Tort Insurance coverage (18) Asbestos (04) Other contract (37) Product liability (24) Real Property	Mass torl (40) Securitles Illigation (28) Environmental/Toxic tort (30)
	Medical malpractice (45) Other PI/PD/WD (23) Eminent domain/inverse condemnation (14)	Insurance coverage claims arising from the above listed provisionally complex case types (41)
	Non-PIPD/WD (Other) Tort Business tort/unfair business practice (07) Civil rights (08) Wrongful eviction (33) Other real property (26) Enfor	cament of Judgment . Enforcement of judgment (20)
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		Other complaint (not specified above) (42)
	Other non-PVPD/WD tort (35) Employment Wrongful termination (36) Asset forfeiture (05) Pelition re: arbitration award (11) Writ of mandate (02)	Partnership and corporate governance (21) Other publicon (not specified above) (43)
	Other employment (15) 2. This case is X is not complex under rule 3,400 of the California Rules of	of Court. If the case is complex, mark the
	factors requiring exceptional judicial management: a. Large number of separately represented parties d, Large number of w b. Extensive motion practice raising difficult or novel e. Coordination with	
-	issues that will be time-consuming to resolve in other countles, s	related actions pending in one or more courts states, or countries, or in a federal count digment judicial supervision
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Ç	25. This case is is is not a class action suit. 6. If there are any known related cases, file and serve a notice of related case. (#ou may t	use form Clif-015.)
i\. س	UDate: 2-20-15 MARK HISRDIMAN	
<u>ل</u> -		TURE OF PARTY OR ATTORNEY FOR PARTY)
U	 Planuit must life this cover sheet with the first paper filed in the action or proceeding (a) under the Probate Code, Family Code, or Welfare and Institutions Code). (Cat. Rules of in sanctions. File this cover sheet in addition to any cover sheet required by local court rule. If this case is complex under rule 3.400 et seq. of the California Rules of Court, you must 	Court, rule 3,220.) Failure to file may result

Form Adopted for Mandatory Use Judicial Council of California CM-010 [Rev. July 1, 2007]

INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO COMPLETE THE COVER SHEET

To Plaintiffs and Others Filing First Papers. If you are filing a first paper (for example, a complaint) in a civil case, you must complete and file, along with your first paper, the Civil Case Cover Sheet contained on page 1. This information will be used to compile statistics about the types and numbers of cases filed. You must complete items 1 through 6 on the sheet. In item 1, you must check one box for the case type that best describes the case. If the case fils both a general and a more specific type of case listed in item 1, check the more specific one. If the case has multiple causes of action, check the box that best indicates the primary cause of action. To assist you in completing the sheet, examples of the cases that belong under each case type in Item 1 are provided below. A cover sheet must be filed only with your initial paper. Failure to file a cover sheet with the first paper filed in a civil case may subject a party, its counsel, or both to sanctions under rules 2.30 and 3.220 of the California Rules of Court.

To Parties in Rule 3.740 Collections Cases. A "collections case" under rule 3.740 is defined as an action for recovery of money owed in a sum stated to be certain that is not more than \$25,000, exclusive of interest and attorney's fees, arising from a transaction in which property, services, or money was acquired on credit. A collections case does not include an action seeking the following: (1) tort damages, (2) punitive damages, (3) recovery of real property, (4) recovery of personal property, or (5) a prejudgment with of attachment. The identification of a case as a rule 3.740 collections case on this form means that it will be exempt from the general time-for-service requirements and case management rules, unless a defendant files a responsive pleading. A rule 3.740 collections case will be subject to the requirements for service and obtaining a judgment in rule 3.740.

To Parties in Complex Cases. In complex cases only, parties must also use the *Civil Case Cover Sheet* to designate whether the case is complex. If a plaintiff believes the case is complex under rule 3.400 of the California Rules of Court, this must be indicated by completing the appropriate boxes in items 1 and 2. If a plaintiff designates a case as complex, the cover sheet must be served with the complaint on all parties to the action. A defendant may file and serve no later than the time of its first appearance a joinder in the plaintiff's designation, a counter-designation that the case is not complex, or, if the plaintiff has made no designation, a designation that

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Auto Tort
    Auto (22)-Personal Injury/Property
         Damage/Wrongful Death
    Uninsured Motorist (46) (if the
         case involves an uninsured
         motorist claim subject to
         arbitration, check this Item
         instead of Auto)
Other PI/PD/WD (Personal Injury/
Property Damage/Wrongful Death)
     Ashestos (04)
         Asbestos Property Damage
         Asbestos Personal Injury/
              Wrongful Death
    Product Liability (not asbestos or
     toxic/environmental) (24)
Medical Malpractice (45)
         Medical Maloractice
              Physicians & Surgeons
         Other Professional Health Care
              Malpractice
     Other PI/PD/WD (23)
         Premises Liability (e.g., slip
              and fall)
          Intentional Bodily Injury/PD/WD
         (e.g., assault, vandalism)
Intentional Infliction of
               Emotional Distress
          Negligent Infliction of
               Emotional Distress
          Other PMPD/WD
Non-PI/PD/WD (Other) Tort
     Business Tort/Unfair Business
        Practice (07)
N.)
     Civil Rights (e.g., discrimination, faise arrest) (not civil
(3)
          harassment) (08)
     Defamation (e.g., slander, libel)
Ν.
     Fraud (16)
     Intellectual Property (19)
(3)
     Professional Negligence (25)
Legal Malpractice
          Other Professional Malpractice
U
             (not medical or legal)
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CASE TYPES AND EXAMPLES
Contract
    Breach of Contract/Warranty (06)
        Breach of Rental/Lease
            Contract (not unlawful detainer
                or wrongful eviction)
        Contract/Warranty Breach-Seller
             Plaintiff (not fraud or negligence)
         Negligent Breach of Contract/
             Warranty
        Other Breach of Contract/Warranty
    Collections (e.g., money owed, open book accounts) (09)
         Collection Case-Seller Plaintiff
         Other Promissory Note/Collections
    Insurance Coverage (not provisionally
         complex) (18)
         Auto Subrogation
         Other Coverage
     Other Contract (37)
         Contractual Fraud
         Other Contract Dispute
Real Property
Eminent Domain/Inverse
        Condemnation (14)
     Wrongful Eviction (33)
     Other Real Property (e.g., quiet title) (26)
         Writ of Possession of Real Property
         Mortgage Forecksure
         Quiet Title
         Other Real Property (not eminent
         domain, landlord/tenant, or
         foreclosure)
Unlawful Detainer
     Commercial (31)
     Residential (32)
     Drugs (38) (if the case involves illegal
         drugs, check this item; otherwise.
         report as Commercial or Residential)
 Judicial Review
      Assel Forfellure (05)
     Petition Re: Arbitration Award (11)
     Writ of Mandate (02)
Writ-Administrative Mandamus
         Writ-Mandamus on Limited Court
             Case Matter
          Writ-Other Limited Court Case
             Review
     Olner Judicial Review (39)
Review of Health Officer Order
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Provisionally Complex Civil Litigation (Cal. Rules of Court Rules 3,400-3,403) Antitrust/Trade Regulation (03) Construction Defect (10) Claims Involving Mass Tort (40) Securities Litigation (28) Environmental/Toxic Tort (30) Insurance Coverage Claims (arising from provisionally complex case type listed above) (41) Enforcement of Judgment Enforcement of Judgment (20) Abstract of Judgment (Out of) County) Confession of Judgment (nondomestic relations) Sister State Judgment Administrative Agency Award (not unpeld taxes) Petition/Certification of Entry of Judgment on Unpaid Taxes Other Enforcement of Judgment Case Miscellaneous Civil Comptaint RICO (27) Other Complaint (not specified above) (42) Declaratory Relief Only Injunctive Relief Only (nonharassment) Mechanics Lien Other Commercial Complaint Case (non-tort/non-complex) Other Civil Complaint (non-tort/non-complex) Miscellaneous Civil Petition Partnership and Corporate Governance (21) Other Pailtion (not specified ebove) (43) Civil Herassment Workplace Violence Elder/Dependent Adult Abuse. Election Contest Petition for Name Change Pelition for Relief From Late Other Civil Petition

Other Non-PI/PD/WD Tort (36)

Wrongful Termination (36)

Other Employment (16)

Notice of Appeal-Labor



Don L. Mathews et al. v. Kamala Harris, et al.

CASE NUMBER

CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET ADDENDUM AND

(C	STATEMENT OF ERTIFICATE OF GROUNDS FOR ASSIGN	•	
This fo	rm is required pursuant to Local Rule 2.0 in all new	w civil case filings in the Los Angeles Superior Court.	
Item I. Che	ck the types of hearing and fill in the estimated lengt	th of hearing expected for this case:	
JURY TRIAL	L? 🗌 YES CLASS ACTION? 🔲 YES LIMITED CASE?	? YES TIME ESTIMATED FOR TRIAL DHOURS! D.D.	AYS
ltem II. Indi	cate the correct district and courthouse location (4 s	steps - If you checked "Limited Case", skip to Item III, Pg.	4):
•	After first completing the Civil Case Cover Sheet for e left margin below, and, to the right in Column A, the	rm, find the main Civil Case Cover Sheet heading for your the Civil Case Cover Sheet case type you selected.	ı
Step 2:	Check one Superior Court type of action in Column	B below which best describes the nature of this case.	
•	In Column C, circle the reason for the court location For any exception to the court location, see Local R	**	
	Applicable Reasons for Choosing Courth	house Location (see Column C below)	
1. Class ac 2. May be i 3. Location 4. Location 5. Location	ctions must be filed in the Stanley Mosk Courthouse, central distri- filed in central (other county, or no bodily injury/property damage) n where cause of action arose, n where bodily injury, death or damage occurred, n where performance required or defendant resides.	trict. 6. Location of property or permanently garaged vehicle. 7. Location where petitioner resides. 8. Location where one of the garties reside. 10. Location of Labor Commissioner Office.	

Step 4: Fill in the information requested on page 4 in Item III; complete Item IV. Sign the declaration.

	A Civi: Case Cover Sheet Calegory No:	B Type of Action (Check only, one)	C Applicable Reasons See Step 3 Above
	Aula (22)	Cl A7100 Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death	1., 2., 4.
	Uninsured Motorist (46)	CJ A7110 Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death Uninsured Motorist	1., 2., 4.
	Asbestos (04)	A6070 Asbestos Property Darnage A7221 Asbestos - Personal Injury/Wrongful Death	2.
	Product Llability (24)	CJ A7260 Product Liability (not asbestos or toxic/environmental)	1., 2., 3., 4., 8.
	Medical Malpractice (45)	A7210 Medical Malpractice - Physicians & Surgeons A7240 Other Professional Health Care Malpractice	1., 4. 1., 4.
	Other Personal Injury Property Damage Wrongful Death (23)	CI A7250 Premises Liability (e.g., slip and fall) A7250 Intentional Bodily Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (e.g., assault, vandalism, etc.) A7270 Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress A7220 Other Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death	1., 4. 1., 4. 1., 3.

Auto Tort \bigcirc N (A) Other Personal Injury/ Property Damage/ Wrongful Death Tort SHORT TITLE:
Don L. Mathews et al. v. Karnala Harris, et al. CASE NUMBER

	A Givil Case:Cover/Sheet Category-No	B Type of Action (Check only one)	C Applicable Reasons - See Slep 3 Above		
	Business Tort (07)	A6029 Other Commercial/Business Tort (not fraud/breach of contract)	1., 3.		
Sperty h Tort	Civil Rights (08)	A8005 Civil Rights/Discrimination	1., 2, 3		
Ty Page	Defamation (13)	A6010 Defamation (stander/libel)	1., 2., 3.		
rongfu	Fraud (16)	A6013 Fraud (no contract)	1., 2., 3.		
Non-Personal Injury/ Property Damage/ Wrongful Death Tort	Professional Negligence (25)	D A6017 Legal Malpractice 1., 2 D A6050 Other Professional Malpractice (not medical or legal) 1., 2			
20	Other (35)	CI A6025 Other Non-Personal Injury/Property Damage tort	2.,3.		
tent	Wrongful Termination (36)	gful Termination (36) A6037 Wrongful Termination			
Employment	Other Employment (15)	☐ A6024 Other Employment Complaint Case ☐ A6109 Labor Commissioner Appeals	1., 2., 3. 10.		
,	Breach of Contract/ Warranty (06) (not insurance)	□ A8004 Breach of Rental/Lease Contract (not unlawful detailner or wrongful eviction) □ A6008 Contract/Warranty Breach -Seller Plaintiff (no fraud/negligence) □ A6019 Negligent Breach of Contract/Warranty (no fraud) □ A6028 Other Breach of Contract/Warranty (not fraud or negligence)	2., 5. 2., 5. 1., 2., 5. 1., 2., 5.		
Contract	Collections (09)	CI A6002 Collections Case-Seller Plaintiff CI A6012 Other Promissory Note/Collections Case	2., 5., 6. 2., 5.		
	Insurance Coverage (18)	Insurance Coverage (18)			
	Other Contract (37)	A6009 Contractual Fraud A6031 Tortious Interference A6027 Other Contract Dispute(not breach/insurance/fraud/negligence)	1., 2., 3., 5. 1., 2., 3., 5. 1., 2., 3., 8.		
D .	Eminent Domain/Inverse Condemnation (14)	CJ A7300 Eminent Domain/Condemnation Number of parcels	2.		
Y C.I.	Wrongful Eviction (33)	CJ A6023 Wrongful Eviction Case	2., 6.		
N GENTAL N	Other Real Property (26)	A6018 Mortgage Foreclosure A6032 Quiet Title A6060 Other Real Property (not eminant domain, landlord/tenant, foreclosure)	2., 6. 2., 6. 2., 6.		
	Unlawful Detainer-Commercial (31)	Cl A6021 Unlawful Detainer-Commercial (not drugs or wrongful eviction)	2., 6.		
는 단 Unlawful Detainer	Unlawful Delainer-Residential (32)	Cl A6020 Unlawful Detainer-Residential (not drugs or wrongful eviction)	2., 6.		
л Т	Unlawful Detelner- Post-Foreclosure (34)	Cl A6020F Unlawful Detainer-Post-Foreclosure	2., 6.		
5	Unlawful Detainer-Drugs (38)	E1 A6022 Uniawful Detainer-Drugs	2., 6.		

SHORT TITUE: Don L. Mathews et al. v. Kamaia Harris, et al. CASE NUMBER

	A Civil Gase Cover Sheet Category No.	B: Type ôf Action (Check only, one)	C Applicable Reasons See Slep 3 Above
	Asset Forfelture (05)	A6108 Asset Forfeiture Case	2., 6.
, sew	Petitlon re Arbitration (11)	A6115 Pelition to Compel/Confirm/Yacate Arbitration	2., 5.
Judicial Review	Writ of Mandate (02)	□ A6151 Writ - Administrative Mandamus □ A6152 Writ - Mandamus on Limited Court Case Matter □ A6153 Writ - Other Limited Court Case Review	2., 8. 2. 2.
•	Other Judicial Review (39)	☑ A6150 Other Writt/Judicial Review	2.(8)
5	Antitrust/Trade Regulation (03)	□ A6003 Antitrust/Trade Regulation	1,, 2,, 8.
ii gan	Construction Defect (10)	CJ A6007 Construction Defect	1., 2., 3.
Provisionally Complex Litigation	Claims Involving Mass Tort (40)	☐ A6006 Claims Involving Mass Tort	1., 2., 8.
Z	Securities Litigation (28)	☐ A5035 Securities Litigation Case	1., 2., 8,
isiona	Toxic Tort Environmental (30)	C) A6036 Toxic Tort/Environmental	1., 2., 3., 8.
Prov.	insurance Coverage Claims from Complex Case (41)	☐ A6014 Insurance Coverage/Subrogation (complex case only)	1., 2., 5., 8.
Enforcement of Judgment	Enforcement of Judgment (20)	 □ A6141 Sister State Judgment □ A6160 Abstract of Judgment □ A6107 Confession of Judgment (non-domestic relations) □ A6140 Administrative Agency Award (not unpaid taxes) □ A6114 Petition/Cartificate for Entry of Judgment on Unpaid Tax □ A6112 Other Enforcement of Judgment Case 	2., 9. 2., 6. 2., 9. 2., 8. 2., 8. 2., 8., 9.
र <u>स</u>	RICO (27)	☐ A6033 Racketeering (RICO) Case	1., 2., 8.
Wiscellaneous Civil Complaints	Other Complaints (Not Specified Above) (42)	A6030 Declaratory Relief Only A6040 Injunctive Relief Only (not domestic/harassment) A6011 Other Commercial Complaint Case (non-tort/non-complex) A6000 Other Civil Complaint (non-tort/non-complex)	1., 2., 8. 2., 6. 1., 2., 8.
M	Partnership Corporation Governance (21)	A6113 Partnership and Corporate Governance Case	2., 8.
S T C 7 () Miscellaneous Civil Petitions	Other Petitions (Not Specified Above) (43)	☐ A6121 Civil Harassment ☐ A6123 Workplace Harassment ☐ A6124 Elder/Dependent Adult Abuse Case ☐ A6190 Election Contest ☐ A6110 Petition for Change of Name ☐ A6170 Petition for Relief from Late Claim Law ☐ A6100 Other Civil Petition	2., 3., 9. 2., 3., 9. 2., 3., 9. 2. 2., 7. 2., 3., 4., 8. 2., 9.

Don L. Mathews et al. v.	Kamala Ha	ırris, et al.	•	CASE NUMBER	
				ence or place of business, performance, or other for filing in the court location you selected.	
REASON: Check the appropriate boxe	* \$40 bb. 10111	share about	ADDRESS:		
under Column C for the type of action this case.			Attorney General Kamala Harris Office of the Attorney General 300 Spring Street		
□1. □2. □3. □4. □5. □6. □	37. 🖾 8. C	19. □10.		Ì	
CITY:	STATE:	ZIP CODE:	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,		
Los Angeles	CA	90013		•	
and correct and that the above-entit	ed matter i	s property file	d for assignment to	of the State of California that the foregoing is true the Stanley Mosk courthouse in the ingeles [Code Civ. Proc., § 392 et seq., and Local	
Rule 2.0, subds. (b), (c) and (d)].				115	
Dated: February 20, 2015			Jesus V	GNATURE OF ATTORNEY FILING PARTY) NEAR HARDIMAN	
DI EASE HAVE THE SOLLOWIN	G ITEMS (OMPLETE	D AND READY TO	BE FILED IN ORDER TO PROPERLY	

PLEASE HAVE THE FOLLOWING ITEMS COMPLETED AND READY TO BE FILED IN ORDER TO PROPERLY COMMENCE YOUR NEW COURT CASE:

- 1. Original Complaint or Petition.
- 2. If filing a Complaint, a completed Summons form for Issuance by the Clerk.
- 3. Civil Case Cover Sheet, Judicial Council form CM-010.
- Civil Case Cover Sheet Addendum and Statement of Location form, LACIV 109, LASC Approved 03-04 (Rev. 03/11).
- 5. Payment in full of the filing fee, unless fees have been waived.
- 6. A signed order appointing the Guardian ad Litem, Judicial Council form CIV-010, if the plaintiff or petitioner is a minor under 18 years of age will be required by Court in order to issue a summons.
 - Additional copies of documents to be conformed by the Clerk. Copies of the cover sheet and this addendum must be served along with the summons and complaint, or other initiating pleading in the case.

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